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Abstract
Volumetric Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been
a recurrent issue on the Internet. These attacks generate a flooding
of fake network traffic to interfere with targeted servers or network
links. Despite many efforts to detect and mitigate them, attackers
have played a game always circumventing countermeasures. Today,
there is an increase in the number of infected devices, even more with
the advent of the Internet of Things and flexible communication tech-
nologies. Leveraging device-to-device short range wireless communica-
tions and others, infected devices can coordinate sophisticated botnets,
which can be employed to intensify DDoS attacks. The new generation
of botnets is even harder to detect because of their adaptive and dy-
namic behavior yielded by infected mobile portable devices. Addition-
ally, because there can be a large number of geographically distributed
devices, botnets increase DDoS traffic significantly. In face of their
new behavior and the increasing volume of DDoS traffic, novel and
intelligent-driven approaches are required. Specifically, we advocate
for anticipating trends of DDoS attacks in the early stages as much as
possible. This work provides an overview of approaches that can be
employed to anticipate trends of DDoS attacks generated by botnets
in their early stages and brings an insightful discussion about the ad-
vantages of each kind of approach and open issues.
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1 Introduction
Volumetric Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are still among the
top five most compromising threats for the Cyberspace. Traditional DDoS
attacks can reach a volume of hundreds of Gigabits per second, generating up
to 56 million packets per second [12, 17, 23]. However, attackers are always
enhancing their techniques and taking advantage of the new technologies,
such as rapid wireless communication infrastructure, cloud computing and
device portability [2, 24]. More and more, a large amount of infected devices
(also known as ‘bots’) coordinate among themselves the generation of thou-
sands of requests against targeted servers or network links [6, 7]. Reports
from the last DDoS attacks against the French hosting giant OVH and the
Dyn DNS companies show the use of a huge amount of infected devices,
including those from the Internet of Things (IoT), such as CCTV cameras,
smart DVR recorders and others.
In addition to the traditional network of bots (botnets), that rely mainly
on infected personal computers, sophisticated botnets comprise also of in-
fected portable and mobile devices. These new generation of botnets lever-
age the advantages of the different communication technologies, such as
cellular and device-to-device communications, masking malicious code prop-
agation and facilitating the exploitation of software vulnerabilities and mak-
ing cheaper to attackers to launch DDoS attacks. Due to the new possibilities
of devices portability and the distributed communication between bots, the
sophisticated botnets present a dynamic and adaptive behavior, that may
circumvent existing defense measures, such as firewalls. Further, because
there can be a large number of geographically distributed devices, the new
generation of botnets can increase DDoS traffic significantly. The reports of
the last DDoS attacks from October 2016 show a volume of traffic around
Terabits generated through mobile and portable devices.
Recent works addressing botnets follow existing approaches designed
against traditional botnets. Also, in general, they have focused on assessing
malicious code propagation, on botnet detection or DDoS attack mitiga-
tion [1, 9, 11, 18, 22]. However, fighting against the new generation of
botnets may require novel, still complementary, and intelligent-driven ap-
proaches in order to cope proactively with the new dynamics produced by
mobile and portable infected devices. Further, existing defenses may not
efficiently mitigate DDoS attacks in progress due to the huge volume of
geographically distributed communication requests.
In face of these limitations, how would be the approaches and tech-
niques to cope with the new generation of botnet-generated DDoS flooding
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attacks? We argue in favor of a new perspective that can anticipate DDoS
flooding attacks trends, as much as possible, in their early stages. Hence,
this work overviews and reinforces the main techniques that have been con-
tributed towards the DDoS flooding attack trends anticipation, promoting
an insightful discussion about them and their application in the context of
botnet-generated DDoS flooding attacks. Further, the techniques are con-
ceptually compared considering their advantages and finally the open issues
are emphasized, leading to more advances in an intelligent-driven proactive
security posture.
2 New Generation of Botnets
Botnet refers to a set of malware-infected devices built to perform tasks over
the command of its human creator (botmaster). Botnets are used to disrupt
the operation of services or extract lucrative gains from unsuspected users.
A basic scenario comprises of a single or multiple botmasters, bots, the
command and control (C&C) architecture and its communication protocol.
Botmasters are essentially human attackers who define all the intelligence
inside the botnet, e.g. the attack goal, the target, and the way to infect and
coordinate bots. Botmasters rely on a set of predefined commands to indi-
cate the tasks required from bots, such as launching a DDoS attack against
a specific target. Today we observe two main classes of botnets, traditional
ones and mobile botnets. The differential aspect between them lies in the
way bots may communicate to receive updated commands from the botmas-
ter. In addition to traditional wired communication channels, mobile bot-
nets take advantage of mobile network infrastructure to communicate. For
instance, certain mobile botnets have the support of SMS transfered over the
cellular network infrastructure, others use WiFi or a hybrid approach, mix-
ing device-to-device communication technologies and infrastructured ones,
without mentioning the possibility to use the traditional wired channels.
From the C&C architectural perspective, botnets leverage the classifi-
cation: i) centralized, ii) distributed or iii) hybrid. In the centralized one,
bots need to contact a central server who will translate the goals and actions
required by the botmaster into commands to the bots. In a distributed ar-
chitecture, all bots act simultaneously as servers and clients (i.e., peers) in
terms of requesting or indicating actions required by the botmaster. Finally,
a hybrid botnet combines the two previous architectures in which some bots
are chosen by the botmaster to act as leaders and indicate actions to the
other bots.
3
The new generation of botnets tends to take advantage of the advances in
computing and communication technologies [2]. Following a hybrid botnet
architecture, bots can quickly adapt the employed communication technol-
ogy, as well as the communication protocol, policies and target. Bots can
mix the advantages of cloud computing with mobile devices’ network pene-
tration and high geographical distribution. The possibility to use different
communication technologies in order to coordinate the botnet and launch
the attack is also an advantage in order to circumvent defenses [2]. The use of
learning techniques to understand the network behavior and vulnerabilities
helps botmasters in how to configure the botnets, producing more efficient
attacks. All these characteristics make the new generation of botnets each
more challenging to detect and prevent, requiring then approaches that can
cope with the intelligence and heterogeneity, in terms of communication and
computing technologies, employed by botmasters.
3 Anticipating DDoS Attacks Trends
Given the unpredictable moves of the botmasters and the increasing sophis-
tication of botnets, it becomes harder to rely exclusively on attack detection,
measurement and mitigation. In face of the new dynamics produced by the
botnets, how would we design new approaches against them? We advocate
and reinforce in this article the necessity of creating proactive and intelligent-
driven approaches, complementary to the existing ones, against actual and
potential threats from botnets and DDoS attacks. It is worth to design so-
lutions towards the creation of adaptive and proactive approaches, that can
not only be efficient against the currently known DDoS attacks, but also
against unexpected (unknown or unclassified) behaviors they may produce
in the future. The rationale for this lies in the fact that attackers are always
increasing the level of sophistication taking advantage of the technology ad-
vances, and do so defenses should pursue the capability of quickly adapt to
this.
We strongly believe that developing a proactive posture to identify trends
of botnets coordination and DDoS flooding attacks as early as possible
can help in the application of effective preventive and defensive techniques.
Warned about the imminence of a possible DDoS attack coordinated by
bots, network administrators and providers can proactively act trying to
mitigate and protect the server or network from it. Identifying unclassified
but potentially harmful network behavior based on preliminary indicators is
an emerging area of research [16] and it has been motivated by the advances
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in computation and communication technologies and artificial intelligence.
Many challenges exist such as defining the set of generic indicators itself,
determine how to promote intelligent gathering and addressing uncertain
reasoning and information fusion.
This work contributes with an overview and discussion about the ex-
isting initiatives towards the detection of botnets and DDoS flooding at-
tacks trends in their early stages. This discussion is led over three groups,
indicators, techniques and gathering methods, in order to facilitate the un-
derstanding of efforts through attack early detection. Then, the currently
employed indicators, techniques and gathering methods to anticipate trends
are highlighted.
3.1 Indicators
Determining a set of indicators able to point out possible evidence of botnet
coordination and the imminence of DDoS attacks is itself a challenge. First,
identifying trends of DDoS attacks and of botnet coordination requires the
analysis of a diverse amount of data. Second, there are some different types
of flooding DDoS attacks which can be categorized from their initiating
feature, such as TCP SYN, ICMP, and new other features the attacker may
exploit. Hence, it would be desirable to provide generic indicators that
could capture DDoS attack trends and assist in their identification even
if the variations in the DDoS attack behavior is unknown or unexpected.
Those indicators play an important role on the attack anticipation, once
they in general are the basis for the employed techniques.
From the literature, the most common observed approach lies in using
a set of attacks or network features that can provide a basis for detecting
trends of attacks. For instance, DDoS flooding attacks are known by the
huge amount of requests and the intense traffic. While the first intends
to overload processing capacity, the later intends to overload network links
bandwidth by increasing the size of packets in the network, for instance.
Hence, static analysis concentrates on the inspection of the network and
communication features, e.g., the number of packets with specific TCP flags
set. A main drawback of this approach consists in the fact that they are in
general designed based on specific characteristics of known DDoS attacks.
What in face of the speed and sophistication of the unexpected DDoS be-
havior may require complementary approaches to be more effective. A real
example lies in the recent Mirai botnet that generated peaks of 623 Gbps
attack traffic employing exceptionally Generic Routing Encapsulation on
packets, what changes from the until know behaviors from previous DDoS
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attacks.
In a complementary direction, a set of generic statistical indicators has
been pointed to identify trends of DDoS attacks in [14]. Those statistical
indicators, as return rate, autocorrelation, variance of the load pattern and
skewness, have been employed in the context of the Internet and they take as
basis the dynamic of the network traffic without being specific to a network
or attack feature. Those generic indicators consider the dynamics in the
state of the network and consider the Internet as a complex adaptive system.
The set of indicators must be employed together and, based on the analysis
of their joint behavior, it is possible to warn when the network is shifting
abruptly and disruptively from one state to another (i.e. an overloaded
state). This is the main aspect taken into account and not the match of the
current network behavior with a previously known one.
Finally, it is worth to mention that feature selection and classification
techniques from data mining have been employed to point out attributes of
the network data traffic relevant for the DDoS attack identification. How-
ever, again those techniques have been employed over previously known
attacks. Maybe, they can be also a good direction towards the definition of
generic indicators, being designed for early detection.
3.2 Techniques
Prominently, the majority of the works has concentrated efforts in the choice
of the employed technique for early identifying DDoS attacks trends. The
technique plays a relevant and critical role, once the volume of data can
be very high and in order to anticipate trends the data might need to be
processed online and into a short period of time. This subsection provides
an overview of the employed techniques. This section does not intent to
survey the techniques, but provide a picture of them.
A set of techniques tries to have as reference a previously known behav-
ior and based on that, they look for matching the observed behavior with
the known one [3, 13, 20, 21]. They can be classified as pattern match-
ing, feature matching and rule algorithms, and despite claiming to provide
early detection of botnet activities or DDoS attacks, they closely follow ap-
proaches employed by traditional DDoS attacks detection. In general, they
are based on attack pattern and signature using artificial neural networks,
data mining, statistical analysis and hybrid techniques. Artificial neural
network methods apply machine learning techniques using patterns or sig-
natures that have already been detected in order to predict whether the
network traffic resembles those patterns and can be part of a botnet or a
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DDoS attack. The accuracy of such techniques depends on various factors,
e.g., the training dataset which may not contain patterns of a new type of
DDoS attack, or the selected features, and then may not be similar to the
DDoS attack in progress and the detection may not be possible.
Further, another data mining technique employed for DDoS attack early
detection is a combination of classification and association rule mining al-
gorithms in which a classification technique can be applied to develop a
learning model for known attack types while the association rule learning al-
gorithm analyzes the traffic and recognizes relationships between the classes
identified in the learning model. Methods based on the Suffix Array data
structure is employed to detect all repeated patterns in a sequence. The
Suffix Array data structure has been employed over fixed width substrings,
such as the IP strings of length 12 [21]. In order to perform this all IP
strings are converted to to the same length, i.e., 12 by adding leading zeros
in octets that do not have length three, i.e., for single digit octets adding
two leading zeros while for double digit octets adding one zero.
Despite these techniques can be applied towards the early detection of
botnet-generated DDoS flooding attacks, in general, they have still been
employed following a traditional perspective of DDoS attack detection, in
which they attempt to detect attack using known indications of attack pat-
terns (these can be either signatures or anomalies) instead of using generic
preliminary indications. Given the increasing sophistication of botnets and
attacks, it is worth to lead for the detection of unclassified, but potentially
harmful behavior, based on preliminary indications before possible damage
occurs. The early detection of unknown attacks and botnet behavior go
through the establishment of hypotheses and predictions on not yet under-
stood (unclassified) situations based on preliminary indications, being each
time more necessary to deal with uncertainty.
Very few works have addressed the problem considering unclassified and
uncertain situations. Those techniques work over the uncertainty of the
attack behavior and bot’s communication. In [10], a method for fully dis-
tributed early detection is presented. The method is founded on the dis-
tributed algorithms that colonies of honey bees use to forage efficiently and
provide appropriate dynamic detection thresholds for anomalous event pat-
terns. The approach addresses the challenges of the decentralization promot-
ing cooperation between detector devices (sensors) over an arbitrary virtual
topology and allowing coordinated adaptation in the thresholds employed to
attack detection by a feedback mechanism. When different attack patterns
appear, sensors learn by cooperation to sense them.
Time-delay neural network (TDNN) is another applied technique. It is
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a kind of neural network that the time factor is hidden inside the signal
with implicit representation. All of the factors of a recent pre-state that
may influence the output result in current state is treated as input signal.
Therefore, the timing relationship of pre-state and pos-state can be mapped
by those signals of data structure. TDNNs follow two kind of architecture.
One is multilayer perception which belongs to feed-forward architecture.
Another is utilized the rationale of error back propagation to learning and
mapping the static relationship between input and output parameters. The
concept of static comes from the stationary processes which means that
the relationship between input and output will not change with timing fac-
tor. The reason that the TDNN has been adopted for early detection of
DDoS attacks in [19] lies in trying to identify the communication between
botmaster and bots in the preparation phase of the DDoS attack from the
features collected in different timing. Therefore, all of the related features
are integrated for associative analysis.
Further, the mathematical property of matrix rank is employed to detect
DoS attacks [15]. This property allows to analyze the quality of the network
traffic once it is extremely sensitive to the randomness in the given matrix.
Exploiting this property and the fact that, in general, the major modes of
DoS involve randomness (or lack thereof) in the IP addresses, researchers
have tried to detect anomaly. In some other works, Gaussian process regres-
sion has also been employed to model malicious and/or abnormal behav-
iors, e.g. [5]. The Gaussian process is a Bayesian data modeling technique
that fully accounts for uncertainty. Like other Bayesian-based inference ap-
proaches, Gaussian processes have a prior and a posterior. Distributions
are defined over functions using the Gaussian process, which is used as a
prior for Bayesian inference. This prior can be flexibly obtained from train-
ing or observation data. Through Gaussian process regression, samples of a
function (model) are observed. Given a set of observation points and their
corresponding real valued observations, it is possible to compute the pos-
terior distribution of a new point, which is also Gaussian (i.e., with mean
and variance functions). By computing the posterior, it is possible to make
predictions for unseen test cases.
3.3 Gathering methods
Gathering data to allow the analysis of the attacks is a issue. Starting from
the sensors deployment until the definition of the employed techniques to
data fusion and aggregation, all those phases are critical. Different efforts
have been made in the literature to improve data gathering with the purpose
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to assist network security, for instance, the proposed HoneyPots and the
recent Darknet [4]. However, addressing the new generation of botnets,
such as the mobile botnets, intensifies the challenge once the heterogeneity
in the networks brings new levels of complexity.
NEMESYS (Enhanced Network Security for Seamless Service Provision-
ing in the Smart Mobile Ecosystem) is an example of system that collects
and analyzes information about attacks considering the core and mobile
network [8]. It provides a data collection infrastructure that incorporates
virtualized mobile honeypots and honeyclients in order to gather, detect and
provide early warning of mobile attacks. By correlating the extracted in-
formation with known attack patterns from wireline networks, authors try
to reveal and identify the possible shift in the way that attackers launch
attacks.
4 Conclusion and Open Issues
This work reinforced the increasing threat resulted from the new generation
of botnet and pointed out efforts leading to a more proactive security posture
based on anticipating trends of botnet and DDoS attack activities. Differ-
ently from the traditional network of infected devices, which were based
essentially on personal computers, the new generation of botnets take ad-
vantage of mobile and portable infected devices and advances in wireless
communicate to boost the impact of volumetric DDoS flooding attacks.
This article presented existing initiatives in the direction of early detec-
tion of botnet and DDoS flooding attacks following three groups: generic in-
dicators, techniques and gathering methods. Each one of those groups finds
itself challenges in the direction of the early detection. The definition of
generic indicators depends in a huge set of features and in the understand-
ing of attacks activities as well as the anticipation of unexpected attacks
behavior.
Regarding to the employed techniques, the majority of them seems to
follow traditional approaches applied for attack detection, even if the fo-
cus lies in a early detection. They have demonstrated to focus on pat-
tern/feature/signature matching, being founded on machine learning tech-
niques, artificial intelligence methods and others that not necessary can work
efficiently against unclassified or uncertain situations, such as a brand new
attack behavior. Few recent works demonstrated to be worried about the
uncertainty of attacks behavior. Those works search to applying techniques
in direction to a more intelligent-driven security. For instance, the initiatives
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inspired by Biology that can learn from new patterns and adapt the defense.
However, some questions are still open regarding to the employed techniques.
For example, how early those techniques addressing uncertainty can detect
botnets and DDoS activities? How much data the technique expect as input
to have an accurate early detection? And what about false positives and
false negatives? How to measure them, considering the uncertain factor?
Concerning to the data gathering, it is acknowledged as a very important
phase for the early detection. Collected data are the basis for analyzing
and predicting trends of botnet coordination and DDoS attacks. A work
presented some initiatives in using virtual HoneyPots considering the context
and behavior expected for the new generation of botnets. Also, some works,
such as those associated to the NEMESYS architecture, mention the use
of cognitive packets in order to promote a more intelligent data gathering.
However, from this author perspective, many issues are still open or unclear.
For instance, where should we exactly deploy the sensors? How should we
aggregate and provide the data fusion considering that we should work with
uncertain situations? Are the existing techniques enough to handle attacks
uncertainty?
Finally, this author concludes that despite early detection systems have
been mentioned in the literature in a very discrete way for more or less
one decade, it seems that the advances in computing and also artificial in-
telligence have motivated authors to revisit ideas for anticipating trends of
botnet and DDoS activities. In the last year, we observe an increase in the
number of published works addressing the DDoS issue following this per-
spective. However, many effort is still necessary in this direction, passing
by investigations to determine generic indicators, define better use of artifi-
cial intelligence techniques and the complex problem of data gathering and
fusion. Open questions exist, and do so opportunities for research.
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